The United States has made permanent a controversial visa-bond program that requires some business and tourist visa applicants to deposit up to $20,000 before entering the country.
Under the new rule, consular officers may require B-1 and B-2 visa applicants from 50 designated countries to post refundable bonds of $10,000, $15,000 or $20,000. The previous $5,000 option has been eliminated, while the maximum has risen from $15,000.
Africa bears the greatest impact, accounting for 30 of the 50 countries:
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cabo Verde, Central African Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gabon, The Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Seychelles, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The other 20 countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Cuba, Dominica, Fiji, Georgia, Grenada, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Papua New Guinea, Tajikistan, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and Venezuela.
The bond is returned if the traveler follows the visa rules and leaves the United States on time. However, no interest is paid while the government holds the money, and paying it does not guarantee visa approval.
The State Department says the pilot program reduced overstays among bonded travelers to nearly zero. But business and tourist visa issuance from affected countries reportedly fell by about 83 percent.
That raises a difficult question: Did the program improve compliance, or did it simply make travel unaffordable?
In many affected countries, $15,000 represents several years of income. Legitimate travelers—including entrepreneurs, researchers and families—may have strong reasons to return home but lack access to that much cash.
Critics argue that the policy risks turning visa screening into a test of wealth rather than risk. It also gives Washington added leverage when negotiating with governments over deportations, security cooperation and information sharing.
The bond may be refundable, but for those unable to raise the money, America remains financially out of reach.
Nigeria has made one of its biggest investments in the military in years. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has approved a 30 to 80 percent salary increase for roughly 250,000 active-duty personnel, raising the annual military payroll from 660 billion to 924 billion Naira. The new pay takes effect on September 1, 2026, with the largest increases going to junior enlisted soldiers—the men and women carrying the heaviest burden in counterinsurgency operations across the Northeast, Northwest, Niger Delta, and Southeast.
At first glance, the announcement sounds like a breakthrough. In reality, it’s more of a long-overdue correction. Years of inflation and a weakening naira have steadily eroded soldiers’ purchasing power, making it harder for many to support their families. The raise helps close that gap, but it doesn’t put Nigerian troops among the continent’s best-paid forces. Soldiers in countries such as South Africa, Algeria, Morocco, and Kenya still receive stronger overall compensation packages, often including housing, healthcare, tax incentives, and other benefits.
Still, the importance of this decision goes far beyond the size of the paychecks.
Military experts have long argued that poor pay affects much more than household finances. It chips away at morale, encourages experienced personnel to leave the service, and can create opportunities for corruption when soldiers are forced to make impossible financial choices. Viewed through that lens, improving military pay isn’t simply an employment issue—it’s an investment in national security.
The salary increase also opens the door to a much broader conversation about how African militaries have been structured for decades.
Many governments across the continent have relied on what’s often called “coup-proofing”—directing the best funding, equipment, and political attention toward elite presidential guard units while conventional forces receive fewer resources. The logic has been to protect those in power. Yet history has exposed the weakness of that approach. Ironically, many of the same elite units created to safeguard governments have gone on to lead coups across West and Central Africa, highlighting the dangers of concentrating military power around the presidency instead of strengthening the armed forces as a whole.
Of course, higher salaries alone won’t solve Nigeria’s security challenges.
Building a modern, professional military requires much more than better pay. Transparent payroll systems, reliable pensions, stronger welfare programs, quality training, and sustained investment in modern equipment all matter just as much. Compensation is only one piece of a much larger puzzle.
By giving its biggest raises to junior enlisted personnel, Nigeria has acknowledged where the greatest pressures exist. That’s an important first step. The bigger test is what comes next. If this pay increase becomes part of a broader effort to strengthen military institutions, improve accountability, and invest in the people who serve, it could mark the beginning of meaningful reform. If not, it risks becoming another temporary fix in a much longer struggle to build a military capable of meeting Nigeria’s evolving security challenges.
Nairobi, Kenya – Former Kenyan Prime Minister Raila Amolo Odinga, a towering and indefatigable figure in Kenya’s political landscape, has died at the age of 80, family sources told Ndiho Media.
Mr. Odinga passed away on Wednesday at Devamatha Hospital in India after suffering a cardiac arrest during a morning walk. Doctors said he was unresponsive to resuscitation efforts and was declared dead at 09:52 local time.
A master political strategist, Odinga was both admired and polarizing — a lifelong crusader for democracy, social justice, and national unity. Born in western Kenya, he was the son of Jaramogi Oginga Odinga, Kenya’s first vice president. His political life was defined by resilience and sacrifice, including years spent in detention under Daniel Arap Moi’s regime for opposing one-party rule.
Odinga ran for president five times, each race leaving a mark on the country’s democratic journey. His 2007 election dispute with Mwai Kibaki plunged Kenya into its worst post-independence crisis, which ended with a power-sharing deal that made him Prime Minister. His 2017 legal challenge led to the historic annulment of a presidential election — a first in Africa.
He was affectionately called “Baba,” “Agwambo,” and “Tinga” by his loyal supporters, revered as both a symbol of resistance and a father figure to Kenya’s pro-democracy movement.
President William Ruto and former President Uhuru Kenyatta led tributes, calling him a statesman whose death “leaves a silence that echoes across our nation.” Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi hailed him as “a cherished friend of India.”
Raila Odinga is survived by his wife, Ida Odinga, and their children. His passing leaves a deep void in Kenya’s public life — a reminder of a man who embodied the country’s long, unfinished journey toward democracy.
Ethiopia and Eritrea are once again walking a dangerous line between fragile peace and open conflict. In a letter to UN Secretary-General António Guterres, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos accused Eritrea of “actively preparing to wage war” and collaborating with armed groups opposed to the government in Addis Ababa. Eritrea has not commented publicly, but the accusation marks the sharpest deterioration in relations between the two countries since their 2018 peace deal.
“No shots have been fired, at least not yet,” I said in a recent analysis. “But the rhetoric has hardened, the positions have deepened, and the specter of war is once again haunting a region that has already endured decades of bloodshed.”
The roots of this tension go deep. After a 30-year struggle, Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993. The joy of liberation quickly gave way to border disputes, culminating in a brutal war from 1998 to 2000 that killed tens of thousands. The Algiers Agreement brought an end to fighting, but the border remained unsettled. For nearly two decades, both countries lived in a cold peace—neither allies nor enemies.
That changed in 2018 when Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed reached out to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. The two men signed a landmark peace agreement, reopening embassies and borders. “I remember people boarding Ethiopian flights and meeting loved ones on the tarmac,” I recalled. “For a moment, it felt like the region had finally turned a page.” Abiy went on to win the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts.
But peace in the Horn of Africa can be fleeting. Just a year later, Ethiopia was engulfed in civil war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF). Eritrea, once an enemy, became Abiy’s ally. The conflict claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and left deep scars. Eritrean troops were accused of some of the worst atrocities, particularly in the ancient city of Aksum. Although a peace deal in 2022 halted major fighting, Eritrea was not a party to the agreement, and tensions soon resurfaced.
At the center of the current dispute is Ethiopia’s desire for access to the sea. Landlocked since Eritrea’s independence, Ethiopia relies on Djibouti for its trade. Abiy has argued that his country has a “right” to Red Sea access, calling it a matter of national survival. Eritrea, which controls the ports of Assab and Massawa, sees that language as a direct threat. “From Asmara’s point of view, Ethiopia’s talk of accessing the Red Sea is not diplomacy—it’s an existential threat,” I said.
If this fragile peace collapses, the consequences could be devastating. The Horn of Africa, already strained by wars in Sudan and Somalia, could face another wave of displacement and instability. The Red Sea, a vital global shipping route, could also become a new front line.
“The Red Sea doesn’t have to become a battlefield,” I said. “It could be a bridge—a shared artery of trade and connection. But that will only happen if both sides stop seeing each other as threats and start seeing themselves as neighbors with intertwined destinies.”
Paul Ndiho is a multimedia journalist and founder of Ndiho Media, covering African innovation, politics, and global affairs.
Malawians went to the polls yesterday in a crucial general election that many believe is about more than just politics—it’s about survival. With inflation rising, food prices soaring, and fuel shortages becoming the norm, voters are seeking more than just promises; they want real solutions. “This election is different,” said Lameck Masina, a freelance journalist based in Blantyre. “People aren’t voting for personalities. They are voting based on issues, especially the economy. It’s about who can really turn things around.” At the heart of this political showdown are two familiar rivals: incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera and former President Peter Mutharika. Both men have led the country in the past, and both now claim they can fix the economy. President Chakwera, who took office in 2020 after a historic court-ordered rerun, is seeking a second term under the Malawi Congress Party banner. He has touted infrastructure projects and reform efforts, but critics point to a worsening economic situation under his leadership.
His challenger, Peter Mutharika of the Democratic Progressive Party, served from 2014 to 2020. His tenure, although also marked by economic woes, is remembered by some as more stable in terms of financial management. Mutharika is now seeking a political comeback, banking on public frustration with the current administration. Masina described the contest as “a rematch,” adding, “It’s like people are choosing between three paths: go back to the old system, stick with the current one, or try something completely new.” Indeed, the ballot features 17 presidential candidates, including another former president, Joyce Banda. But despite the crowded field, the race is centered on Chakwera and Mutharika. For voters, the stakes couldn’t be higher. “Some people were literally coming from fuel queues to join voting lines,” Masina reported. “It’s queue to queue—fuel to ballot. That’s how deep the crisis runs.” Malawi’s economy has been hit hard by a combination of global shocks and domestic mismanagement. COVID-19, the war in Ukraine, and extreme weather events have all contributed to the situation. But voters aren’t letting leaders off the hook. “Yes, the president admits global issues have affected Malawi,” said Masina. “But people are saying, ‘We need local solutions, and we’re not seeing them.'” Corruption is another primary concern. Chakwera once earned praise for appointing an anti-corruption czar known as the “Iron Lady,” but her efforts were reportedly stifled. “When you fight corruption in Malawi, it fights back,” said Masina. “That’s what happened to her.” Logistical problems at polling stations were minimal but not absent. Some voter verification machines malfunctioned, forcing election officials to revert to manual methods, slowing down the process. With no clear frontrunner expected to clinch more than 50% of the vote, a runoff seems likely. The Malawi Electoral Commission has eight days to announce official results, but partial returns may begin to emerge within 48 hours. Regardless of the outcome, Malawians are hoping for more than political change—they’re hoping for economic relief. “People are tired,” Masina emphasized. “They’ve tried hope before. Now, they want results.”
By Ndiho Media Rwanda has received the first group of seven migrants deported from the United States—part of a controversial agreement that could see up to 250 people resettled in Kigali. The Rwandan government confirmed the mid-August arrival but withheld nationalities. Four deportees will remain in Rwanda, while three opted to return to their home countries. Rights groups warn that deporting people to “third countries” where they have no ties could breach international law, especially if those countries lack strong human rights protections. Gatebuke’s Warning: “Commodifying Human Beings”
Claude Gatebuke, a survivor of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and executive director of the African Great Lakes Action Network, told Ndiho Media that Rwanda’s role in such agreements fits a troubling pattern. “Rwanda has been used as a partner in deals where unwanted migrants or asylum seekers are sent not back to their home countries, but to Rwanda,” he said. Gatebuke called the practice “legalized human trafficking,” arguing that it commodifies people while lining the pockets of Rwanda’s ruling elite. He pointed to past deals with Israel and the UK that he says left deportees vulnerable to extortion and abuse. “It’s less about humanitarianism and more about money and political protection,” he added. Szlavik’s Defense: “Not a New Precedent” Joseph Szlavik, Partner at Scribe Strategies & Advisors and a participant in negotiations, rejects Gatebuke’s characterization. “This isn’t the first time the United States has deported people to a third host country,” Szlavik told Ndiho Media. “There are preexisting treaties and policies—like ‘Safe Third Nation’ agreements with Canada and Mexico. President Trump is not setting a new precedent here.” Szlavik stressed that the deportees are not ordinary migrants but “hardened criminals—people convicted of murder, rape, and other serious crimes.” He argues the deal is both lawful and diplomatic: “It demonstrates Africa rising as an international partner and taking part in solution-oriented approaches beyond aid.” Monda’s Rebuttal: “A Dumping Ground for America’s Rejects” David O. Monda, a journalist and professor at CUNY–Guttman Community College, disagrees sharply.
“All three countries—Rwanda, South Sudan, and Eswatini—are small, landlocked, and poor, with unstable political systems and human rights concerns,” Monda said. “It’s an elephant-and-ant situation where the U.S. holds all the leverage.” Monda warned that deporting people with no ties to Africa risks turning the continent into “a dumping ground for America’s rejects.” He pointed out that larger African states such as Kenya and Nigeria have rejected similar proposals, suggesting that the burden falls on nations least able to push back. The Legal Gray Zone International law permits transfers to third countries only if the destination is considered safe and individuals can contest their removal. In 2023, the UK’s Supreme Court blocked the UK’s Rwanda plan due to concerns about safety. And here in the U.S., a district court temporarily halted an Africa-bound deportation flight in May, before the Supreme Court allowed it to proceed without ruling whether South Sudan was “safe.” What This Means for Rwanda—and Africa Supporters argue that Rwanda is seizing an opportunity to raise its diplomatic profile. Critics say the deal reinforces damaging stereotypes of Africa as a convenient solution for Western problems. Gatebuke’s bottom line: “Development money does not erase repression. What Africa needs is justice and accountability—not to be treated as a convenient destination for those the West doesn’t want.” Szlavik sees pragmatic diplomacy. Monda sees exploitation. Rwanda’s role in this debate is likely to shape not only its image, but also Africa’s place in the broader conversation on migration, sovereignty, and human rights.
Halfway through 2025, it is another critical election year in Africa. At least ten countries, such as Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Malawi, and Tanzania, are scheduled to conduct presidential or general elections. Gabon held its elections in April. While the calendar is lighter than in 2024, when nineteen countries went to the polls, this year will test how new technologies, especially Artificial Intelligence (AI), are reshaping African democracy.
Across the continent, AI is quietly making its way into election management and political campaigns. It is being used to register voters, verify identities, analyze data, and detect cyber threats. At the same time, political actors are experimenting with AI to push targeted messages, generate disinformation, and even create deepfakes. The result is a double-edged sword: AI could help elections become more efficient and credible—or undermine trust in already fragile systems.
How AI Is Being Used
There is no single record of how many African countries employ AI in elections, since most adoption happens quietly and varies in scope. But recent studies and reports, including work by Yiaga Africa and International IDEA, point to several notable cases:
Nigeria used Automated Fingerprint Identification in 2023 to prevent duplicate registrations and now applies AI to counter cyber threats and misinformation.
Ghana introduced facial recognition technology for voter verification in its 2024 elections.
Kenya utilized natural language processing under the Umati project in 2022 to monitor online hate speech, while its electoral commission launched WhatsApp chatbots for voter education.
South Africa relied on AI for voter verification in the 2024 elections, but campaigns also used it to spread disinformation and deepfakes.
Eswatini and Madagascar reported using AI tools for voter authentication and automated chatbots.
Senegal sparked controversy after deploying AI in its “parrainage” system to screen presidential aspirants’ endorsements.
Yiaga Africa’s 2024 survey of 22 electoral commissions shows that only a handful are actively experimenting with AI. Most remain cautious, citing high costs, weak regulation, and fears of bias or misuse.
Promise and Risk
AI’s role in elections generally falls into two areas. On one hand, it helps electoral management bodies with voter registration, biometric verification, and detecting fraud or irregularities. On the other hand, political campaigns utilize it to target voters with customized messages—sometimes crossing the line into misinformation or manipulation.
International IDEA notes that AI can make elections more inclusive and transparent, but warns it is not a cure-all. Through its AI for Electoral Actors program, IDEA is collaborating with election officials, civil society organizations, and the media in cities such as Dakar and Johannesburg to enhance literacy and capacity in the use of AI in politics.
Expert Perspectives
For Zeph Shamba, Chairman of the International Political Campaigns Expo, Africa cannot afford to ignore AI.
“Africa doesn’t want to be left out … it’s a wave that’s coming. We can’t avoid it. Gone are the days when a leader was limited in reaching out to voters—AI speeds up processes. But it also poses risks. That’s why we need open, informed debate.”
Cape Town-based campaign strategist Glen Mpani agrees that AI is transforming politics, but highlights the dangers of its misuse.
“Technology is now at the center of all political campaigns. With mobile penetration, citizens can be reached directly on their phones. That changes everything. But if these tools fall into the wrong hands, they spread disinformation. Every tool is both an opportunity and a threat.” Mpani argues that regulation must reflect African realities.”We can’t just copy rules from the West.
Challenges Ahead
The integration of advanced technologies presents a range of challenges, despite its significant advantages. Throughout Africa, the implementation of these technologies remains quite limited. Several electoral bodies lack sufficient funding to support these systems. Furthermore, there are growing concerns among citizens regarding issues such as privacy breaches, surveillance, and biases in algorithms..Few countries have established regulatory frameworks for AI in elections, and the opacity of some tools raises additional concerns.
Civil society networks, such as Yiaga Africa, AfEONet, and ELOG, are pushing for broader conversations. Supported by the Luminate Group, they convened election officials and observers from 22 countries to weigh opportunities and risks. The consensus is that AI can improve elections, but without transparency and accountability, it may actually deepen mistrust.
Analysts say AI is not a silver bullet. It may help close gaps in voter verification or fraud detection, but it will not solve the structural and political challenges facing African elections. What matters most is how the technology is introduced—fairly, inclusively, and transparently.
By Ndiho Media South Africa’s public health system has become the battleground of a growing national conflict. Operation Dudula, a vigilante movement, has been accused of blocking foreign nationals from public clinics and hospitals. Members claim undocumented migrants are draining scarce resources, while human rights organizations argue the campaign is unconstitutional, xenophobic, and risks sparking a wider health crisis. Ndiho Media spoke to Dr. Maropeng Mpya, a legal and political analyst based in Johannesburg, to unpack these tensions. He reminded us that migration into South Africa is not new. “Migration started in the 1800s during the gold rush. Mozambicans, Zimbabweans, and Swazis came in, and it has always been tied to South Africa’s labor market,” Mpya explained. Operation Dudula insists it is targeting undocumented migrants, not all foreign nationals. But Mpya questioned their approach. “The people whom the Dudula movement is primarily chasing away are illegal foreigners. But asking for IDs at clinics is not dignified. That should be the role of the state, not vigilantes.” On the question of whether foreigners showing up at a clinic or hospital is criminal, he was clear: “It is not the action of an undocumented foreigner to go to a criminal hospital. The Constitution provides for them to get medical care. You heal them first, because person first — then you can deal with their immigration status.” He warned of the dangers of denying care to the vulnerable. “I put myself in the position of a young mother in labor pains, being told I must go away, where I cannot even get help. What type of uncivilized behavior is that?” While acknowledging frustrations, Mpya said the real problem lies elsewhere. “Youth unemployment is around 40%. People feel the system is failing them. But blaming migrants is not the solution. The real problem is government incompetence and failure to manage borders.” For Mpya, the way forward is clear: “Chasing people away in pain will never solve our problems. The solution lies in better governance, stronger regional cooperation, and respecting the dignity of every person who seeks help.”
By Ndiho Media The Trump administration’s agreements with Rwanda, South Sudan, and Eswatini to accept deportees labeled as dangerous criminals have drawn both praise and criticism. Supporters see them as a diplomatic breakthrough that strengthens U.S.–Africa ties, while critics warn they raise serious legal and ethical questions under international law. Joseph Szlavik, Partner at Scribe Strategies & Advisors and a key figure in behind-the-scenes negotiations with these African governments, says the arrangements are rooted in long-standing policy. “This isn’t the first time the United States has deported people to a third host country. There are preexisting treaties and policies—like the ‘Safe Third Nation’ agreements we have with Canada and Mexico. President Trump is not setting a new precedent here,” Szlavik told Ndiho Media. Szlavik explains his program as fixing a logistical issue: some countries of origin will not repatriate citizens, especially at moments of strained diplomatic relations, like with Cuba or Venezuela. He specifies that those being rescreened are “hardened criminals—people convicted of murder, rape, and other serious crimes” and not ordinary migrants. For Szlavik, they also provide an ample diplomatic opportunity. “Under President Trump, embassies are quickening their response to U.S. queries. It demonstrates Africa rising as an international partner and taking part in solution-oriented approaches beyond aid,” he said. However, David O. Monda, who is a journalist as well as a professor at City University of New York – Guttman Community College, does not concur. In his argument, he asserts that arrangements risk violating U.S. constitutional protections, together with the non-refoulement rule at international law, where individuals cannot be transferred to states where they will not enjoy their rights or safety. “All three countries are small, landlocked, and poor, with unstable political systems and human rights concerns,” Monda said. “It’s an elephant and ant situation—an asymmetrical power dynamic where the U.S. holds all the leverage.” Monda challenges the morality of dispatching people who have not been to Africa to countries where they do not have connections. “It creates the perception that Africa is becoming a dumping ground for America’s rejects,” he noted, adding that larger African countries like Kenya and Nigeria have rejected similar proposals. Though Szlavik points out that the Supreme Court upheld the legality of the program and African governments’ willingness to cooperate, Monda warns against circumventing due process.
The Trump administration’s agreements with Rwanda, South Sudan, and Eswatini to accept deportees labeled as dangerous criminals are being praised by those familiar with the process, who say the deals are legal, strategic, and strengthening U.S.–Africa partnerships.
Speaking exclusively to Ndiho Media, Joseph Szlavik, Partner at Scribe Strategies & Advisors, revealed that he has been heavily involved in behind-the-scenes negotiations with these African governments to make the arrangements possible.
“This isn’t the first time the United States has deported people to a third host country. There are preexisting treaties and policies—like the ‘Safe Third Nation’ agreements we have with Canada and Mexico. President Trump is not setting a new precedent here,” Szlavik explained.
The program addresses a logistical problem: some nations refuse to take back their citizens, particularly when relations with the U.S. are strained, as with Cuba and Venezuela. In such cases, African partners have stepped in.
“South Sudan took in eight people, including Cubans with serious criminal records, because returning them to Cuba was impossible,” Szlavik said.
He stressed that those deported under these deals are not ordinary migrants.
“These are hardened criminals—people convicted of murder, rape, and other serious crimes. There’s not a lot of sympathy for them,” he said.
Beyond security, Szlavik views the agreements as part of a broader diplomatic and humanitarian strategy. His direct involvement in discussions has helped persuade African governments to see these arrangements as mutually beneficial.
“Under President Trump, requests to process deportees are taken seriously. Embassies are more responsive, and it shows Africa stepping up as a global partner,” he said.
Szlavik also underlined that diplomacy is often conducted discreetly.
“Foreign policy is not negotiated on live television. These talks were legal, went to the Supreme Court, and the court confirmed they’re fully within the law,” he said.
The deals align with Trump’s “trade, not aid” approach to Africa. Szlavik pointed to the administration’s efforts in advancing peace talks—such as between Rwanda and the DRC—and encouraging political transitions in countries like Guinea and Gabon.
“President Trump has taken a personal interest in Africa. He likes building one-on-one relationships with leaders. When there’s respect and direct dialogue, good things happen,” Szlavik said.
For supporters, these deportation deals are not just about immigration—they’re about reshaping U.S.–Africa relations and treating African nations as equal partners in solving global challenges.
Ndiho Media,LLC. 